(IME - 2009/2010 - 1ª FASE)
Leia a passagem seguinte e responda à pergunta que a seguem.
Billions of dollars spent on defeating improvised explosive devices (IED) are beginning to show what technology can and cannot do for the evolving struggle.
Two platoons of U.S. Army scouts are in a field deep in the notorious “Triangle of Death” south of Baghdad, a region of countless clashes between Sunni insurgents and Shia militias. The platoons are guided by a local man who’s warned them of pressure-plate improvised explosive devices, designed to explode when stepped on. He has assured them that he knows where the IED’s are, which means he is almost certainly a former Sunni insurgent.
The platoons come under harassing fire. It stops, but later the tension mounts again as they maneuver near an abandoned house known to shelter al-Qaeda fighters. A shot rings out; the scouts take cover. They don’t realize it’s just their local guide, with an itchy trigger finger, taking the potshot at the house. The lieutenant leading the patrol summons three riflemen to cover the abandoned house.
Then all hell breaks loose. One of the riflemen, a sergeant, steps on a pressure-plate IED. The blast badly injures him, the two other riflemen, and the lieutenant. A Navy explosives specialist along on the mission immediately springs into action, using classified gear to comb the area for more bombs. Until he gives the all clear, no one can move, not even to tend the bleeding men. Meanwhile, one of the frozen-inspace scouts notices another IED right next to him and gives a shout, provoking more combing in his area. Then a big area has to be cleared so that the medevac helicopter already on the way can land.
That incident, which took place on 7 November 2007, exhibits many of the hallmarks of the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan – a small patrol; a local man of dubious background; Navy specialists working with soldiers on dry land; and costly technologies pressed into service against cheap and crude weapons. And, most of all, death by IED.
The guide of the U.S. platoon ...
Gabarito:
may have set some of the IED along the field some time before.
Resolução:
A) INCORRECT: pois o guia não levou os militares direto para um complexo de IED, mas sim para uma localidade em que poderia haver esses IED, tanto lá quanto no caminho pelo qual seguiram.
B) INCORRECT: pois o guia não é nenhum especialista, mas apenas um guia local que os alertou sobre essas placas de pressão e explosivos.
C) INCORRECT: pois o guia não atacou os soldados americanos com uma arma, mas ele apenas disparou com descuido um tiro em uma casa.
D) CORRECT: pois ao longo da descrição da situação, podemos perceber que de fato esse guia pode ter definido algum IED ao longo do campo algum tempo antes.
E) INCORRECT: pois não foi o guia que pisou no IED, mas sim foi um dos soldados. O tumulto também começou com o disparo ouvido.